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    昔者庄周梦为蝴蝶，栩栩然蝴蝶也。自喻适志与！不知周也。俄然觉，则蘧蘧然周也。不知周之梦为蝴蝶与？蝴蝶之梦为周与？周与蝴蝶则必有分矣。此之谓物化。
    - The 'Equivalence of Things' (齐物论) chapter of the Zhuangzi (庄子) (c. 3rd c. B.C.E.)



    Once upon a time I, Zhuang Zhou (庄周), dreamt I was a butterfly.
    Flapping my wings in true butterfly fashion, I was happy as could be, and I knew nothing of any person named Zhuang Zhou.
    But suddenly I awakened, astonished to be Zhuang Zhou.
    I still don't know whether as Zhuang Zhou I was dreaming I was a butterfly or whether as a butterfly I was dreaming I was Zhuang Zhou.
    There ought to be a difference between Zhuang Zhou and a butterfly, but this is called the transformation of things.
    - David K. Jordan translation (adapted)

     

     

     

     

    Pyrrhonian Skepticism

    Is there an even number of stars in the Milky Way?

    Skepsis is the Greek word for 'investigation'


    1. We can distinguish between the following:
      1. Ordinary skepticism: We do not know propositions that we would gladly grant not to know
      2. EXAMPLE: We do not know whether there is an even number of stars in the Milky Way

      4. Philosophical skepticism: We do not know propositions that we ordinarily think we know
      5. EXAMPLE: We do not know whether the sun will rise tomorrow

    1. There are 3 doxastic attitudes that I can adopt toward the proposition p (e.g. 'The sun will rise tomorrow'):
    2. Belief that p;
    3. Disbelief that p; or
    4. Suspension of judgment that p

    6. Recall the following axioms from epistemic logic:
    Axioms of epistemic logic:
    (D) Bap → ~Ba~p If Agent a believes that p, then she does not believe that not-p
    (D′) ~Ba⊥ Agent a's beliefs cannot be inconsistent

    1. Axioms D and D′ allow me to identify disbelief in a proposition p with belief in its negation ~p
    2. ∴ The number of doxastic attitudes with respect to 'p ⊻ ~p' would be reduced to 2:
    3. Belief that p ⊻ ~p; or
    4. Suspension of judgment that p ⊻ ~p


    Pyrrho of Elis
    (c. 360-270 B.C.E.)

    There are 2 varieties of philosophical skepticism:
    1. Cartesian skepticism or academic skepticism:
    2. S1: The only justified attitude with respect to any proposition in a field of propositions F is suspension of judgment
    3. S2: We should believe that S1

    1. Pyrrhonian skepticism or absolute skepticism:
    2. S1′: The only justified attitude with respect to any proposition φ is suspension of judgment
    3. S2′: We should also suspend judgment that S1′


    1. According to the Pyrrhonian skeptic:
    2. Suspension of judgment (or epoché) is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition φ
    3. φ includes the proposition that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition
    4. Suspension of judgment is a way to achieve calm (or ataraxia) in the face of seemingly intractable disagreement
    5. NOTE: Pyrrhonian skepticism takes its name from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 B.C.E.), whom most ancient historians regard as the 1st genuinely skeptical philosopher
     

     

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